As the last hope for
an economic recovery, monetary policy has proven lacklustre at best and here is
why things have not turned out as planned.
It has been more than five years since the onset of the
global financial crisis but it still seems as if we are stuck cleaning up the
mess. The task of getting the economy
back on track has been made even trickier with policy makers being side-tracked
by a number of misadventures such as the Eurozone crisis and the fiscal cliff
in the US. Governments everywhere have
been shackled by large debts and central banks have been relied on to save the
day. Despite having a better track
record in the past, the inability of central banks to use monetary policy to
fix the problems created by the unique circumstances of our current dilemma have
prolonged the economic stagnation. Your
Neighbourhood Economist looks at why the central banks had to try new things and why even this fresh approach has not improved the outlook for the future.
Monetary policy had always provided a road map back to
economic recovery in the past. The
directions were simple – lower interest rates would help get the economy back
on the right path. The theory behind this was that making it cheaper for firms
or households to borrow would give the economy a boost at a time when other
sources of growth were flagging. Interest rates could be topped up again once
the economy had been kick started with inflation used as a gauge on the
strength of the economy (i.e. low inflation suggests weak demand with rising
inflation seen as a sign of an overheating economy).
However, even interest rates close to zero have failed to
gain traction amid the consequences of the global financial crisis. There are two main reasons for this which
relate to borrowers and lenders. On the
lending side, banks have shrunk their operations due to chronic uncertainty
that pervaded both the financial well-being of the banks themselves and any borrower
they might lend to – banks were unsure of the potential for losses on their own
books, let alone those of other business which they may lend to. A wave of new regulations also acted to
hamstrung banks who reacted by lending less to lower the level of risk on their
balance sheets with other options such as selling shares not available (this
problem was most pronounced in Europe – see Another reason not to bank on Europe for more).
Borrowers too weren't in the mood with many companies and
households having already taken on too much debt during the years of cheap
credit which led up to the crisis.
Uncertainty was another factor as wage earners worried about their jobs
while firms were more concerned with their own survival rather than borrowing
to expand their operations. Rather than
borrowing, the opposite was more likely to be the case as consumers paid down
their credit cards while firms repaid their debt and kept cash for a rainy
day. A lack of willingness on both sides
(lenders and borrowers) meant that more debt was out of the question no matter
how low interest rates would be set.
This put pay to conventional notions of monetary policy and required a
fresh approach.
Quantitative easing was taken on-board as a possible
solution. This involved central banks
buying bonds to provide funding for banks and companies wanting a different
source of cheap funding. The bond buying
also lowered the returns on these safer assets and pushed investors to put
their money into more risky assets such as buying bonds of struggling countries
in Europe like Greece or Spain. The
extra money in the global financial system was expected to help grease the
wheels of banking which had seized up. But
little of this additional cash has reached the real economy and has been
hoarded by banks or companies or has gone to pump up share prices.
The limited extent to which their policies fed through to
the economy prompted central banks to throw more and more funds at the problem
with the Federal Reserve in the US buying US$85 billion in bonds each month and
the Bank of Japan pledging to double the money supply in two years (for more on
this gamble, see All bets are ON). The acceleration
of monetary policy has not driven the economy much faster through the slowdown.
However, even just the notion of an
eventual retreat by central banks has caused jitters among investors who have
benefited most up to now from the real-world consequences of monetary policy (refer
to Caution - Windy Road Ahead to see how
monetary set the tone of stock markets).
So the outlook for the stagnating economy is not good. Governments remained mired in their debt with
even relative bright spots such as the recovery in the US economy in peril when
factoring in likely cuts to government spending in years to come. Central banks have dug themselves into deep
holes by trying to do too much and even the limited effects of monetary policy
will be difficult to maintain (for more on why thus might be the case, see The perils of doing too much). The result being that problems in the economy
such as a shortfall in demand and uncertainty over the future continue to drag
on consumer and business sentiment. All
it would take to ignite economic growth again is a commonly held belief that
the future will be brighter. But,
considering all of the above, it is proving a hard sell.
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